FRAUD in York County Courthouse and U.S. Federal Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

Just have a look at part of this TRO and you’ll see how ugly and nasty York County Courthouse and U.S. Federal Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania have become as they engage in numerous acts of fraud, harassment, intimidation, denial of due process rights, ex-parte communications, and too many other judicial injustices to list.  We’ll let the TRO speak for itself.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

         FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT

Stephen G. Conklin                  :

Plaintiff                  :         1:10-CV-2501

v.                                    :         (Hon. Robert J. Mariani)

Kristine M. Anthou, et. al.         :

Defendants                  :

 

RENEWED MOTION FOR EMERGENCY TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

 

Now Comes, Stephen G. Conklin, Plaintiff in the above-captioned matter, who moves upon this Court to Renew his Motion for Emergency Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and for Preliminary Injunctive Relief, pursuant to Fed.R. Civ. 65, enjoining Defendants from physically removing Plaintiff and his family from their home, as is currently set to occur on Thursday, December 8, 2011 at 2:00 pm. Plaintiff has drafted but has yet to complete, a motion for Recusal/Re-Assignment of this case outside of the Third Circuit, not because of the recent assignment of this particular judge, but because of what Plaintiff perceives is a continuation of demonstrable mistreatment at the hands of the Middle District, that has adversely affected Plaintiff as well as those who have suffered at the hands of the court for having had Don Bailey as their Attorney. Because of the time constraints, Plaintiff will be filing his Recusal Motion separately tomorrow. In support of this TRO/Preliminary Injunction thereof, Plaintiff now states as follows:

1. From the outset, Plaintiff is cognizant that your Honor, by verbal order on or about November 17, 2011 only recently received Plaintiff’s complaint, together with a myriad of other cases, most notably of which, many involve Attorney Don Bailey and/or former clients thereof; all of this occurring, upon information and belief, only one week after having ascended to the federal bench.
2. Plaintiff is a former client, and close friend of Don Bailey, who Plaintiff believes, like so many other clients of Mr. Bailey, have been seriously harmed by the court, and/or more particularly, certain members thereof, in what cannot be described as any less than an attempt to “get Don Bailey.” This attempt yet remains ongoing.
3. Many of Mr. Bailey’s clients on their own accord, filed judicial complaints, none of which, upon information and belief, received any investigation, much less, saw the light of day. Plaintiff, recognizing the futility of this, opted instead to exercise his first amendment rights by pleading what he believes in his federal complaint, and how, given Plaintiff’s experiences, questioned whether it was even remotely possible for Plaintiff to receive fair treatment.
4. As more fully set forth below, Plaintiff’s concerns were validated when Judge Kane struck those portions of Plaintiff’s complaint, and his motion for recusal in its entirety, sua sponte, and, by opinion then directly launched an attack upon him.
5. Now, Plaintiff and with good reason, is concerned as to why and/or what their motivation may be that finds Plaintiff, together with many of Don Bailey’s and his clients’ cases suddenly assigned to you.
6. Please understand, in no wise or by any means is Plaintiff questioning your character or integrity; and, whilst it is clear you are new to the bench, and thus little be known, Plaintiff accords you nothing less than that of an honorable man and jurist. In this regard, Plaintiff wishes you nothing less than a long and prosperous tenure. However, surely even your Honor has to wonder why it is these particular cases, given their weight and import, and in consideration of all that they entail, have so readily been assigned. It is upon experience, that Plaintiff questions their motivation, not yours.
7. The assignment of Plaintiff’s case to your Honor occurs exactly one day after Judge Rambo took a parting shot at Plaintiff, whereby, having had before her Plaintiff’s Application to proceed in forma pauperis  (IFP) for nearly six (6) months (May 27, 2011) Judge Rambo, without sufficient reason or cause, and without opportunity for Plaintiff to be heard, denied Plaintiff’s request for IFP status. Plaintiff has subsequently applied to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, and will be further seeking to vacate Judge Rambo’s order.
8. With all due respect to your Honor, given the necessity of some period of orientation and/or adjustment required in becoming a federal judge, it is difficult to fathom how in such a short period of time your Honor could possibly be fully apprised of the serious implications arising out of Plaintiff’s claims, let alone, the dozens of other cases now dumped in your lap.
9. However, given the imminent nature of irreparable harm that Plaintiff and his family now face, which so exigently brings Plaintiff prostrate afore this Court, time is something Plaintiff simply does not possess.

10.Plaintiff’s case in particular, entails some complex matters, spanning over many years of abuse, involving, inter alia, due process,  abstention principles, res judicata, etcetera; and, Plaintiff is concerned how there can be anyway, in such a short period of time, your Honor can thoroughly learn everything there is to know about Plaintiff’s case, coupled to the applicable law governing it, in sufficient time to give Plaintiff’s instant request for relief a fair evaluation of the merits.

11.Equally, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s complaint and all he has subsequently pled, it is nigh impossible, given the current circumstances, whereby, Plaintiff can fully plead his cause and all that it entails in this Motion. All that Plaintiff can do is try to put forth as best he can as many of the essential elements he can, and hope that this Court will not only look deeper into the plethora of underlying germane issues as otherwise previously pled by Plaintiff, but in addition, because of the urgency of the matter, in the interim, grant Plaintiff his TRO and thereafter allow Plaintiff to more fully present his case during a Preliminary Injunction hearing.

12. Much like Diogenes with his lamp, Plaintiff is only seeking an honest court; and, the ability to redress his grievances via a full, fair and impartial hearing.

13.Plaintiff believes and avers that there is a coordinated fix to not only once more attempt to unlawfully remove Plaintiff from his property, but to cut off his access to the courts. Currently, Plaintiff and his family, are now scheduled to be physically removed from their property on Thursday, December 8, 2011 at 2:00pm.

14.Previously, on April 5, 2011, Plaintiff filed a TRO and Preliminary Injunctive Relief, which was immediately denied (within 24 hours) without a hearing or any judicial appearance whatsoever by Judge Blewitt and was quickly affirmed by Judge Rambo the next day.

15.Proof that neither of these judges gave any consideration to any of the issues being raised and proof that these judges harmed the Plaintiff comes from the fact that even the York County court, which has and yet continues to otherwise act demonstrably egregious in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights, subsequently recognized that there was a procedural error and/or clear facial defect that justified the cancellation of the writ of possession as was to occur on April 7, 2011.

16.Plaintiff believes that Judge Rambo and Judge Blewit intentionally denied Plaintiff’s motion and request for preliminary injunctive relief with the intent that the execution of the writ of possession would go through and Plaintiff would be (hopefully, in their view) “out of their hair” so to speak; however, from the incipience of Plaintiff’s filing of his federal complaint, and all through his subsequent motions and/or pleadings, Plaintiff has, and continues to make clear: Regardless of the lawful means, manner or forum required -Plaintiff will be heard.

17.Moreover, Plaintiff avers that the report and recommendation of District Magistrate Blewitt, seeking to deny Plaintiff’s motion for TRO and preliminary injunctive relief, which Judge Rambo precipitously adopted, without even affording Plaintiff a cursory hearing, was not only, in plaintiff’s mind, intentionally misguided, but went yet a step further, as to intentionally and improperly mis-address the merits of Plaintiff claims, with the added intent to provide “marching orders” for adversary counsel(s), by indicating how the court intended to handle Conklin.

18.Plaintiff on or about May 27, 2011 filed an appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, seeking denial of his request for preliminary injunctive relief, together with collateral issues. Aside from Plaintiff’s recent, albeit, suspect denial of IFP status by Judge Rambo, thus causing Plaintiff to file directly with the Third Circuit, Plaintiff’s appeal remains pending.

19.The above notwithstanding, it should be noted, that Plaintiff believes that the disparate tone and tenor that helped fuel the Middle District Court’s lack of consideration towards Plaintiff was clearly set in motion by Judge Kane, who, coinciding with Plaintiff’s request for TRO/preliminary injunction, filed two (2) orders/opinions.

20.The first of these was issued with the intent to wholly abnegate Plaintiff’s free speech, by striking pertinent portions of his Complaint, as well as his motion for recusal in its entirety, sua sponte, falsely labeling both as immaterial, scandalous and impertinent.

21. The second order/opinion finds Judge Kane recusing herself, but clearly in a display wanton of judicial temperance and/or in a fit of pique, took a parting shot, by launching an outrageous attack on Plaintiff.

22.Plaintiff subsequently challenged both of these via reconsideration, seeking, amongst other things, a hearing on these matters, all of which was denied by the Rambo Court.

23.This unwarranted and scurrilous retaliatory attack, the ramifications which now reverberate throughout, having irreparably cast Plaintiff in a false light, as to be discussed in further detail below.

24.Nonetheless, Plaintiff clearly in his complaint complained of repeated violations of amongst other things, his due process rights throughout the proceedings in the York County courts over an extended period of time, and this court clearly and unquestionably had/has jurisdiction over such matters under the abundant case law set forth in the original motion.  Plaintiff incorporates the entirety of his motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunctive Relief filed on April 5^th, 2011 and his subsequently filed Motion/brief in support of reconsideration of his denial, as if each are fully referenced herein in their entirety.

25.Under principals of Rule 60(b) Plaintiff believes that Judge Rambo, much as Judge Kane who preceded her in Plaintiff’s instant case, (and Judge Conner, for that matter) have an extensive, longstanding bias and prejudice against Plaintiff and attorney Don Bailey that are manifest on the record and that reveal themselves through their orders.

26.The essential basis for this renewed Motion for Temporary Restraining Order is that, despite dozens of requests over a half a decade or more for a hearing, Plaintiff has never been provided with a full, fair and impartial hearing on the record.

27.Plaintiff was sued by the EMC and Grenen Defendants in State Court, i.e., he is/was the Defendant, and he denied the allegations that formed the basis of his claim, and has asked repeatedly that before any property is taken away from him, he be given his right to a full, fair and impartial hearing before a just tribunal.

28. It is the most basic principle of Constitutional law that any Judge, even a District Judge who has only been there for a month, as Plaintiff believes may well be present here, that a Judge would know that this type of situation requires notice and an opportunity to respond, i.e., a hearing.  In Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 407, 414-19 (1897), conspicuously a case involving alleged fraudulent assignments, as has been alleged in this case from the start, the Supreme Court stated as follows:

The fundamental conception of a court of justice is condemnation only after hearing. To say that courts have inherent power to deny all right to defend an action and to render decrees without any hearing whatever is, in the very nature of things, to convert the court exercising such an authority into an instrument of wrong and oppression, and hence to strip it of that attribute of justice upon which the exercise of judicial power necessarily depends.

In McVeigh v. United States, 11 Wall. 259, the court, through Mr. Justice Swayne, said (p. 267):

“In our judgment, the District Court committed a serious error in ordering the claim and answer of the respondent to be stricken from the files. As we are unanimous in this conclusion, our opinion will be confined to that subject. The order in effect denied the respondent a hearing. It is alleged that he was in the position of an alien enemy, and hence could have no locus standi in that forum… . The liability and the right are inseparable. A different result would be a blot upon our jurisprudence and civilization. We cannot hesitate or doubt on the subject. It would be contrary to the first principles of the social compact and of the right administration of justice.”

And quoting with approval this language, in Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Field, again said (pp. 277, 278):

“The principle stated in this terse language lies at the foundation of all well-ordered systems of jurisprudence. Wherever one is assailed in his person or his property, there he may defend, for the liability and the right are inseparable. This is a principle of natural justice, recognized as such by the common intelligence and conscience of all nations. A sentence of a court pronounced against a party without hearing him, or giving him an opportunity to be heard, is not a judicial determination of his rights, and is not entitled to respect in any other tribunal.

“That there must be notice to a party of some kind, actual or constructive, to a valid judgment affecting his rights, is admitted. Until notice is given, the court has no jurisdiction in any case to proceed to judgment, whatever its authority may be, by the law of its organization, over the subject-matter. But notice is only for the purpose of affording the party an opportunity of being heard upon the claim or the charges made; it is a summons to him to appear and speak, if he has anything to say, why the judgment sought should not be rendered. A denial to a party of the benefit of a notice would be in effect to deny that he is entitled to notice at all, and the sham and deceptive proceeding had better be omitted altogether. It would be like saying to a party, appear and you shall be heard; and, when he has appeared, saying, your appearance shall not be recognized, and you shall not be heard. In the present case, the District Court not only in effect said this, but immediately added a decree of condemnation, reciting that the default of all persons had been duly entered. It is difficult to speak of a decree thus rendered with moderation; it was in fact a mere arbitrary edict, clothed in the form of a judicial sentence.”

 

In Capel v. Childs, 2 Cromp. & Jer. 558, (1832) the validity of a proceeding by a bishop under an act of Parliament against a church vicar was in question. A requisition upon the vicar to do a certain act was held to be in the nature of a judgment and void, as the party had no opportunity of being heard. Lord Lyndhurst, C.B., at p. 574, said:

“A party has a right to be heard for the purpose of explaining his conduct; he has a right to call witnesses, for the purpose of removing the impression made on the mind of the bishop; he has a right to be heard in his own defence. On consideration, then, it appears to me, that, if the requisition of the bishop is to be considered a judgment, it is against every principle of justice that that judgment should be pronounced, not only without giving the party an opportunity of adducing evidence, but without giving him notice of the intention of the judge to proceed to pronounce the judgment.”

. . . for no proposition can be more clearly established than that a man cannot incur the loss of liberty or property for an offence by a judicial proceeding until he has a fair opportunity of answering the charge against him, unless indeed the legislature has expressly or impliedly given an authority to act without that necessary preliminary. . . . [in] no case in which you are to have a judicial proceedings, by which a man is to be deprived of any part of his property, without his having an opportunity of being heard. . . [it is the] great principle of justice, that, in every judicial proceeding, `Qui aliquid statuerit parte inauditâ alterâ, Æquum licet statuerit non æquus fuerit.‘”

Can it be doubted that due process of law signifies a right to be heard in one’s defence? If the legislative department of the government were to enact a statute conferring the right to condemn the citizen without any opportunity whatever of being heard, would it be pretended that such an enactment would not be violative of the Constitution? If this be true, as it undoubtedly is, how can it be said that the judicial department, the source and fountain of justice itself, has yet the authority to render lawful that which if done under express legislative sanction would be violative of the Constitution. If such power obtains, then the judicial department of the government sitting to uphold and enforce the Constitution is the only one possessing a power to disregard it. If such authority exists then in consequence of their establishment, to compel obedience to law and to enforce justice courts possess the right to inflict the very wrongs which they were created to prevent.

In Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350, the court said (p. 368):

“It is a rule as old as the law, and never more to be respected than now, that no one shall be personally bound until he has had his day in court, by which is meant, until he has been duly cited to appear, and has been afforded an opportunity to be heard. Judgment without such citation and opportunity wants all the attributes of a judicial determination; it is judicial usurpation and oppression, and can never be upheld where justice is justly administered.”

29.Moreover, due process is not satisfied merely by way of notice and hearing, but further that, “ It is elementary that ‘ a fair trial by a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.’ “ Weiss v. U.S., 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)); See also Sill v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 462 F.2d 463, 469 (3d Cir. 1972) (concluding that the basic requirements of due process are not simply notice and the opportunity to be heard, but “ to be heard by a fair and impartial tribunal.”)

30.The process that has been afforded plaintiff in the York County courts has consistently failed to meet basic sue process.  Plaintiff was sued by the defendants, i.e., his is a defendant in the York proceedings, and, having been given notice of the claim against him, (he was served with the complaint), he does not now have to come forward and establish his right to a hearing – he has that right by virtue of his denials.

31. Courts are in the business fundamentally of granting hearings, and particularly before property rights are lost.  This notion either has completely escaped the “learned” judges Rambo and Blewitt, or, as plaintiff has said, and intends to prove, their abnegation of their judicial duties suggests that they know “the fix is in.”

32. Unfortunately due to the conduct of this Court’s predecessor jurists, Judges Rambo and Blewitt, this Court is immediately presented with the opportunity to either be in or be out of that same fix.

33.The Constitution demands a hearing, Plaintiff demands a hearing, and this Court must recognize that right, grant it, and opt out of the fix, or tarnish forever the judicial oath only recently taken, and further tarnish the federal court system like these other lawless judges are doing; or, as the Court put it in Hovey, create a permanent “blot upon our jurisprudence and [which] would be contrary to the first principles of the social compact and of the right of the administration of justice.”  Sadly, Plaintiff believes, the jurists that have preceded this Court have lost all sight of those principles.

34.Despite this, Plaintiff now stands to be forcibly removed from this property this week and has never been granted a hearing, despite repeatedly requesting one.

35.The York Court and all parties in this case have worked together to deny the Plaintiff of his most basic Constitutional rights in the State Courts, and these are Federal Constitutional violations over which this court has supremacy.

36.As the basis for the urgent need of this request, Plaintiff is in the impossible position of being expected on Thursday, December 8^th, 2011 to respect and comply with the authority of public officials and officers who he believes, as clearly provided for in the case law, are acting in complete deprivation and denial of his due process rights, actions which, under Hovey, “is not a judicial determination of his rights, and is not entitled to respect in any other tribunal.”

 

37.Plaintiff views these acts under these circumstances as the rogue actions of treasonous officials, and does not recognize them as in any way legitimate and will not recognize them as legitimate unless he is afforded his due process right to a hearing.

38.Under the circumstances, this Court has the opportunity to not perpetuate the blatant errors of Judge Rambo and Judge Blewitt, which were an obvious fix to begin with, that in absence of this Court’s immediate intervention, places the Plaintiff, his family, and even these officials in the position of going into a situation where they know that their desire to find cause for the use of force is of high likelihood.

39.Plaintiff is not intent to merely abandon his home voluntarily. Plaintiff is a peaceful and God-fearing man, who neither has nor harbors weapons, and has absolutely no intention to use force of any kind.

40.However, in light of the egregious nature of the ongoing and somewhat conscious-shocking deprivation of his rights, which Plaintiff believes, is nothing short of the manifestation of evil, Plaintiff cannot see how it be he should simply leave voluntarily and allow evil to triumph, uncontested.

41.Accordingly, Plaintiff fully suspects, albeit, expects that “they” would desire nothing less than to use [excessive] force, even to the extent that such a “condition” need be manufactured, as to harm and/or injure Plaintiff and his family in the unlawful eviction from their premises.

42.Furthermore, this cause of concern for the safety of Plaintiff and his family is additionally exacerbated by Judge Kane’s order/opinion of April 5, 2011, whereupon, Judge Kane deliberately cast Plaintiff in a false light; where, Judge Kane, in due course of recusing herself from Plaintiff’s complaint, nonetheless took a parting shot (and Plaintiff contends, no less retaliated) stating in pertinent part that, “..the Court is concerned that any potential decision in this matter adverse to Plaintiff’s interests may be viewed as retaliation for Plaintiff’s  longstanding and outrageous pattern of hostility and disrespect towards this court and its judicial officers.”

43.As more fully set forth below, Plaintiff fervently believes, that despite Plaintiff’s protestations, this parting shot by Judge Kane, as remains yet of record, is tantamount to having given license to other authorities to both openly threaten, as well as further intimidate, coerce, and harm Plaintiff into going away.

44.The unwarranted use of force in taking Plaintiff’s premises, is itself, squarely premised and/or otherwise firmly rooted in previous acts by the York County Sheriff’s department, as fully pled in Plaintiff’s federal complaint, specifically as it relates both a January 27^th, and February 18^th, 2009 hearing(s). ( See Compl. ¶¶ 305-317 & ¶¶ 318-332) Transcripts of both previously provided to the Court in his original TRO, marked as exhibits K and L, respectively, which are fully incorporated herein by reference.

45.Currently before this Court is Defendant County’s Statement of Facts and Motion for Summary judgment, where, the County fully admits that a certain Deputy sheriff put his hands on Plaintiff, who as a defendant, was not only denied the attention of the court in defending himself, but was summarily coerced and intimidated into silence, and thus, clearly and unequivocally denied a full, fair and impartial hearing. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference Defendant’s Statement and Motion for Summary Judgment, together with Plaintiff’s Statement, and Motion in opposition coupled to supporting affidavits as if all are fully set forth at length herein.

46.The County, in spurious defense of their aberrant action(s), which they readily admit doing, states that it was necessary to do so because Plaintiff was “disruptive”; however, per Plaintiff’s reply in opposition, as further supported by the transcripts and moreover, by affidavits of witnesses present, clearly shows that at no time was Plaintiff “disruptive” or ever out of hand, or anything less than polite and courteous.

47.The only dispute here is whether, as the County presumably contends, Judge Linebaugh instructed the Deputy to do so from the bench, or as Plaintiff contends, such instruction, if any, (in the course of a custom, policy of practice, targeting Plaintiff as well as those similarly situated) occurred prior to taking the bench; which, as the affidavits point out, no such instruction by Judge Linebaugh was seen by any of the witnesses.

48.It is abundantly clear, particularly as it relates to the January 27^th hearing, Plaintiff (as a defendant) was being denied not only his right to be heard in his own defense, to subpoena material witnesses or  present evidence, all of which occurred before a court that was anything but a fair and impartial tribunal.

49. As to the February 18^th hearing, as Plaintiff averred in his complaint and the County defendants do not deny occurred, Plaintiff, prior to the commencement of the hearing was once more physically accosted by a sheriff’s deputy, as to intimidate and coerce Plaintiff into silence.

50. Of equal import is the fact that, as the February 18th transcripts show, Judge Linebaugh had already decided the case, prior to any testimony being taken whatsoever; and testimony that was thereafter taken includes, but is not limited to the fact that Defendant Anthou had previously perjured herself by way of sworn affidavit, (and Defendant Grenen suborned) which was in pertinent part, the very subject of the hearing. (See Compl. ¶¶ 267-275)

51.Additionally, aside from a plethora of facts averred, spanning three separately state-court docketed cases, controversies all of which Defendants created, and the record(s) thereof fully supports, if not for the seriously disturbing nature of the aforesaid hearings, there would never have been a sale of Plaintiff’s property on February 23, 2009, and accordingly, no need to find Plaintiff afore this Court now, seeking emergency relief.

52.The fact is, the sale was allowed to occur on February 23, 2009, even though no order was issued by the court until March 2, 2009; and, that order only addressed striking the actual recordation of a Mortgage Satisfaction Piece, via power of attorney, and not, as the primary issue was and yet is, whether the Defendant Bank was paid in full for the mortgage, that Defendants in their fraud, continue to conceal. (See Compl. ¶¶ 338-346)

53.This issue was further exacerbated by Defendants in creating additional controversy, by filing a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive relief, (2009-SU-0674-08) and serving same in open court on February 18, 2009; that, despite the York court clearly ignoring certain pleadings and requests, this Complaint sat idle on the docket for nearly two years, until recently, and suspect enough, being assigned to Defendant Musti-Cook for adjudication. Aside from the clear impropriety of Defendant Musti-Cook presiding over this matter, obviously the fix is in, once again.

54.Plaintiff contends, and has amply pled in his complaint that the payment tendered to Defendants for his mortgage by a third party accommodator, on or about October 13, 2008 for which Defendants subsequently defaulted on, under 13 Pa.C.S. § 3603(b) such default/dishonor extinguishes the underlying debt.

55.However, the egregious nature of Defendants does not stop here, as not only have Defendants defaulted (dishonored) on the acknowledgement of payment tendered for the mortgage, but as equally pled, Defendants took that payment for value received and as alleged, deposited that payment in a Fidelity account. (See Compl. ¶¶ 410-422)

56.This fraud represents newly discovered evidence, that has never been litigated, much less adjudicated, nor has it ever been refuted, and clearly, this issue alone warrants further inquiry by this court.

57.Thus, Plaintiff avers, that the Defendant bank has been paid in full; that said defendants have engaged in a fraud, having stolen those funds, and are now seeking to take Plaintiff’s property as well; all of which, at minimum, is now incumbent upon this court to enjoin defendants from ejecting Plaintiff and his family, until such time a full, fair and impartial hearing may be held.

58. Nonetheless, as pled by Plaintiff, the York Court’s complicit nature with other Defendants that seeks to cover-up the many wrongs being done, as manifest in a continuum of due process violations and multiple frauds and their concealment, all to the wholesale abrogation/deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Surely, it is the defendants desire that this court continue to look the other way.

59.The mere fact that the York Court, or any court for that matter would ever so cavalierly countenance fraud is truly disturbing.

60.A massive fraud has been firmly implicated in this and in addition to the fraud stated above, is further evidenced by additional frauds perpetrated, as supported by expert affidavits and, these frauds too, have never been refuted, and represent both newly discovered evidence that has never been litigated and evidence of fraud that has never had a full, fair and impartial hearing before a just tribunal. These expert affidavits were and yet remain before this Court at the time of Plaintiff’s original request for injunctive relief and are marked as exhibits B and  H-1, respectively.

61.Plaintiff only obtained knowledge of the extent of the frauds committed, as it relates to Defendants mortgage assignments, having received his expert affidavit on or about March 16, 2011, and the expert affidavit on the fraudulent verification as attached to Defendants Complaint in Mortgage foreclosure, on or about April 4, 2011.

62.Whilst it is true, Plaintiff has raised the issue of “manufactured assignments” beginning back with Plaintiff’s preliminary objections to Defendant’s Complaint in Mortgage Foreclosure, and from the beginning sought an evidentiary hearing on the matter, which coincidentally, Defendant Musti-Cook acknowledged, the sad fact is Plaintiff never got a hearing on the matter, much less one that was fair and impartial.

63.Moreover, this fraud consists of additional newly discovered evidence appertaining to these “assignments” that Plaintiff could not have known until he obtained the expert’s report. This evidence even includes the fact that the Notary Natalie Flowers, who somehow notarized an alleged assignment three (3) days prior to its purported execution (November 8^th and 11^th, respectively) has herself, operated as if she were a Vice President of various banking institutions.

64.Whereas, Plaintiff has previously pled in various documents, that the backdating of the above assignment from its “execution “ date of November 11^th, 2005, back to June 18^th, 2002, this issue was never litigated as well, but, like so much of what Plaintiff has put before the court(s) simply ignored. Be that as it may, facially, and by what Plaintiff finds to be case law in Michigan, New York, California, and elsewhere (except here) it is the “Execution” date that is controlling, not the antecedent date, for purposes of assignment.

65.Had even that single issue been addressed, it would then be abundantly clear, that despite the backdating of assignment from Chase Bank to Deutsche Bank, presumably to June 18, 2002, the actual assignment did not occur until November 11, 2005, that actual date of alleged execution. Accordingly, as also alleged by defendants, Deustche Bank could not possibly assign anything to Defendant EMC on October 20, 2004 as otherwise claimed. This argument is further and undeniably buttressed by the fact that on October 18, 2004, a mere two (2) days before the so-called assignment from Deutsche to Defendant EMC, Defendant JPMorgan Chase f/k/a Chase Bank of Texas, sells Plaintiff’s property as an illegal sheriff’s sale.

66.As to the second expert affidavit, is also newly discovered, in that Plaintiff had no clue until he received his expert affidavit on or about April 4, 2011, that the “verification” attached to defendant’s Complaint in Foreclosure was made by a party who was never who they claimed to be.

67.This fraudulent verification, made by a party who is now shown to have never worked for Defendant EMC, but was in fact employed by Lenders Processing Services, a foreclosure mill exposed on Sixty Minutes, by Plaintiff’s expert witness.

68.If not for these frauds as outlined in the expert affidavits, Defendants Grenen and Banks could have never succeeded in their Mortgage foreclosure complaint, and accordingly, there would have never been a judgment entered against Plaintiff, nor a complaint in ejectment; the latter of which beings Plaintiff before this court now, seeking emergency relief.

69.Defendants have not nor cannot rebut the fraud but through the pleadings of the various defendants and particularly, inclusive of three separate state court actions Defendants Grenen & Birsic, Mary D. Grenen, Kristine M. Anthou, as well as JpMorgan Chase and EMC are wanton to, in blanket form, use res judicata  (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion). For reasons further stated below, these specious claims in defense cannot possibly (justly) survive.

70.On or about April 13, 2011 Plaintiff filed in the York Court a Petition to Void Judgment, for fraud, under the Mortgage Foreclosure docket (2006-SU-0433-Y06) and attached as exhibits, the expert affidavits. Plaintiff then sought to have this matter heard on during a hearing already scheduled for May 11, 2011 on the erroneously entered judgment on order of court, as docketed under the ejectment action. (2009-SU-5228-04) Subsequent thereto, Plaintiff also filed for a Pre-hearing conference, relating to the fraud, as well as a memorandum in support.

71.Additionally on April 13, 2011 Plaintiff filed Motion to Compel Discovery, and equally sought to have argument on this matter during the already scheduled May 11, 2011 hearing. Plaintiff sought to compel discovery, particularly as it related to various verifications [Defendant] had submitted, that by any reasonable account, on the face of them, being wholly illegible, without title, date, etcetera, neither verification would even remotely pass muster in an honest court.

72.As with virtually every single attempt by Plaintiff to obtain discovery, [defendant] Grenen, except for two (2) responses to Admissions, as to be noted more fully below, repeatedly either ignored, or blatantly refused to submit, (including stating so in writing) that repeatedly frustrated any attempts by Plaintiff to uncover the truth, all of which was further exacerbated by the York Court.

73.Prior to the May 11^th hearing, Plaintiff filed Answer and New Matter to  [Defendant’s] complaint in ejectment. Following extensively stated, detailed denials of [Defendant’s] claims, Plaintiff provided New Matter that specifically centered on three (3) distinct issues of fraud. Two (2) of these encapsulated the fraud alleged in Plaintiff’s Petition to Void Judgment; the last, incorporated Plaintiff’s new-found evidence that was first pled in Plaintiff’s federal complaint on December 7, 2010.

74. At the May 11^th hearing Plaintiff was successful in having the judgment stricken, but could not have heard, though properly presented, either his Petition to Void Judgment or Motion to Compel Discovery.  In the Court’s May 16^th opinion, as to the Void Judgment, the court erroneously captioned it under the ejectment action (2009-SU-5228-04) and not as it was presented under the previous foreclosure action (2006-SU-0433-Y06) and then went on to state:

Now we take the opportunity to address a second motion to void judgment and a motion to compel. It is unnecessary to decide since we have granted the motion to strike. So I will enter an order of my own dismissing the motion to avoid [sic] judgment April 13, 2011 as moot”. (emphasis added)

 

75.There was no “second motion to void judgment” as referred to in Judge Thompson’s order, nor, as otherwise improperly posited by the Court, was the issue relating to fraud, moot.

76.The Petition to Void Judgment is/was filed and docketed under 2006-SU-0433-Y06 and involved issues of fraud perpetrated by Plaintiff and their counsel in the previous foreclosure action; whereas, the Motion to Strike Judgment, as docketed under 2009-SU-5228-04 was squarely vested in the glaring facial defect of a judgment and writ of possession (that never should have been) entered by Plaintiff on or about March 21, 2011.

77.In Judge Thompson’s second order/opinion, relating to the Motion to Compel Discovery, the Court stated in pertinent part that:

We then have a motion to compel. I’m going to take judicial notice of the posture of the proceedings and deem the motion to compel untimely, premature, unnecessary at this point of time. This is without prejudice for Mr. Conklin to revisit the issue depending upon how the case now proceeds given his answer and new matter. But we’re not addressing the motion to compel because we don’t believe we have to at this particular point. The motion to compel dated April 13h [sic] is denied presently without prejudice to Mr. Conklin to raise again now in the context of the proceedings going forward in light of his answer and new matter.. (emphasis added)

 

78.Nonetheless, as has always been the case, Plaintiff’s efforts were indeed frustrated and subsequently denied by the york court, with not only with clear bias, but with intentional prejudice.

79.On or about May 31, 2011, [defendant] EMC through counsel defendant, responded to Plaintiff’s New Matter, but, in responding, they did not answer.

80.On or about June 10, 2011, Plaintiff mailed his first set of admissions to [defendant] Grenen/EMC. Following a long and querulous rant of denials, said Defendant’s (in a first ever for Plaintiff, i.e. receipt of discovery request) tepidly responded to Plaintiff’s First Set of Admissions on or about June 28, 2011. Contained within [Defendant] Grenen/EMC’s response was the acknowledgement that “discovery is ongoing”.

81.On or about June 20, 2011, Plaintiff sent [defendant] Grenen/EMC his first set of Interrogatories. To date, these interrogatories have never been responded to, as Plaintiff contends, any attempt to respond would have brought into the light, yet another fraud being perpetrated by said defendants, as Plaintiff had previously and repeatedly pled in state court, that the alleged signatories of verifications supplemented to their complaint/amended complaint in ejectment did not exist.

82.Additionally, on this date, Plaintiff filed and served a Motion for a More Definitive Answer to his New Matter, or in the alternative, deem New Matter admitted.

83.On or about July 8, 2011 [Defendant EMC filed for Judgment on the pleadings in the ejectment action. On or about July 28, 2011, Plaintiff filed a detailed reply brief in opposition to judgment on the pleadings, on or about July 28, 2011.

84.On or about July 21, 2011, [Defendant] responded in the same fashion as with the first set, on or about August 9, 2011.

85.In the interim, on or about September 12, 2011 a Judgment on the pleadings was entered in the ejectment action, citing that there were no material facts in dispute, even though in Plaintiff’s new matter he once again raised the issues of multiple fraud as it relates to the Petition to void judgment, as well as the additional fraud, theft and perjury relating to the satisfaction of the mortgage.

86.Plaintiff thereafter filed for reconsideration, which the York court never responded to, and accordingly, on or about October 12, 2011 Plaintiff sought to have an appeal filed to the Appellate Court, which the York County Prothonotary refused to accept, much less stamp or docket.

87.Immediately thereafter, Plaintiff wrote an extensive Writ of Mandamus to compel Plaintiff’s appeal to be timely taken; but, experienced in the disparate treatment plaintiff receives in York, Plaintiff additionally filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal, Nunc Pro Tunc, and it was on the Appellate Court’s direction that the York Court acted upon and accepted Plaintiff’s appeal.

88.As directed by the York Court, on or about November 10, 2011 Plaintiff timely (antedated) filed his appeal on the judgment on the pleadings, together with Praecipe and Petition to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff was subsequently approved IFP status, on November 14, 2011, however to date, Plaintiff never received the approval order from the York Prothonotary, but only learned of it from another source and thereafter obtained a copy thereof.

89.On or about November 21, 2011 Plaintiff’s home was posted with a Writ of Possession. As with the Order approving IFP status, Plaintiff never received from the York Prothonotary, as required by Rule 236, the entry of judgment; or in addition any praecipes filed for writ of possession. Nor, did [defendant ] Grenen send any notices of filings, which, in the context of a variety of other pleadings/motions and/or notices required to be sent, is not untypical for [defendant] Grenen not to do. In fact, the state-record is replete with numerous instances where Plaintiff has noted in his motions/pleadings where Grenen, Plaintiff contends, intentionally failed to mail service.

90.In fact, as pointed out in Plaintiff’s complaint, there is one particular instance where Plaintiff was never served with a motion for continuance of sheriff sale, that was “approved” for Defendant Himes, on behalf of Defendants Grenen/EMC by Defendant Renn on or about December 11, 2011 before it was ever stamped or otherwise entered onto the docket. (See Compl. ¶¶ 279-293)

91.As otherwise pled in plaintiff’s complaint, plaintiff was specifically in the York Courthouse on December 11th, having just received an order from Judge Renn, that included on its distribution list, Defendant Lawrence T. Himes, Jr., (whose appearance was never entered) as to question Defendant Chuk as to whether, as Plaintiff had long suspected, and has also pled, that ex parte communications were going on. (see Compl. ¶¶ 242-243, ¶ 250 ¶ 288) (see ¶¶ 246- 250 generally)

92.Once again, if not for this under-handed act(s) by said Defendants, which denied Plaintiff notice and an opportunity to be heard, there would have been no way that the sale of Plaintiff’s property could have occurred on February, 23, 2009. This is so, as at minimum, it would have required the defendants to both re-post the property, publicize, and notify all parties in interest prior to. (See Compl. ¶¶ 284-287)

93. Plaintiff has come to learn through painful experience of salting the docket, and the Prothonotary’s failure to mail, requires Plaintiff to as frequently go to the courthouse and retrieve a certified docket, whenever he had the funds to do so.

94.In this particular aforesaid instance, the docket was checked three (3) separate times following December 11, 2011, (December 12th, 18th, and 22^nd – see Compl.¶ 282) none of which showed the supposed motion/order as otherwise purported to occur.

95.In any event, Plaintiff has recently filed two (2) Application(s) for Stay with the lower court; the first under the ejectment docket as filed on or about November 23, 2011, together with Petition and praecipe to proceed in forma pauperis  with Notice of Appeal, as it relates to the denial of Plaintiff’s Motion to Void Judgment, all of which occurred two (2) days following the posting of Plaintiff’s property; and, the second one,  under the Foreclosure docket, as filed on or about _________.

96.Because of Plaintiff’s tortured experience at the hands of the York Court, Plaintiff knows with a high degree of certainty, that the lower court is likely to wait until either late afternoon of December 7^th, or the morning of December 8^th, where they will predictably deny both Applications for Stay; and, it is yet again, for these reasons and more that Plaintiff comes afore this Court seeking relief.

97.Nonetheless, Plaintiff did not receive notice, and probably the only point that Plaintiff and Defendant Grenen/EMC will ever agree, is the fact that in their Response to the Emergency Application for Stay, as mailed on or about November 29, 2011 said Defendants also claim in ¶ 4 that [Plaintiff] never received the notice or were served, presumably first by the prothonotary, as it relates to the Prothonotary of Judge Clarence N. Patterson Jr’s., order, granting plaintiff IFP status, and therefore, they go on, to deny it even exists; and, possibly with regards to this plaintiff, to which said Defendant was specifically called on November 23, 2011 at 12:06 pm (the call lasting 1:12 sec) and Plaintiff has proof of mailing that they were subsequently served with his filing.

98.Be that as it may, the central and most germane of issues yet remain, in that, the taking of Plaintiff’s (or anyones) property without due process of law is about the most basic Constitutional violation that can occur and risking damage to persons and their property cannot provide a more compelling basis of why this court must act immediately.

99.Rambo and Blewitt would not even grant Plaintiff a telephone appearance to discuss the issues and acted to completely deny all of Plaintiff’s claims on the abundant record put before this court in less than 48 hours from the time the motion was filed is absolutely astonishing.

1. Plaintiff has rights to hearings in Federal Court as well, and demands that this court, in keeping with it’s Constitutional mandate, schedule some sort of hearing on the TRO and immediately schedule a full evidentiary hearing on the Preliminary Injunction.
2. In addition to the entire course of Constitutionally deficient conduct that led to the April filings, the Plaintiff points out that this rogue course of conduct continues, and that the coordination of officials between the State and Federal Courts and Officials has become increasingly clear.
3. Since first seeking injunctive relief with this Court, Plaintiff has been subjected to a series of what Plaintiff avers are coordinated attacks, that have taken on a distinctive pattern of activity between the state and federal court. There is no question in Plaintiff’s mind, that behind the scenes, certain members of this court and the York court are talking.
4. In Judge Kane’s April 5, 2011 order/opinion, attacks Plaintiff, as having an “longstanding and outrageous pattern of hostility and disrespect towards this Court and its judicial officers.”
5. Presumably, this bald assertion relates to Judge Conner, who, Plaintiff believes, and the evidence of Plaintiff’s prior cases afore him reveal, as well as several other cases Plaintiff has looked into, that Judge Conner, amongst other things, harbors a distinct racial animus.
6. Plaintiff is not hostile by any means, and anyone who knows Plaintiff, knows this. The truth of the matter it is Plaintiff who has been subjected to hostility by the court, and Plaintiff, is no longer in a position to simply sugar-coat what is going on.
7. As to this issue of hostility, it is and remains Plaintiff’s belief, that following Plaintiff being duly alarmed with a certain memorandum authored by Judge Conner, on or about May 26, 2006, Judge Conner became openly and actively hostile to Plaintiff’s then-counsel, threatening sanctions, for amongst other things, “grammatical errors” and, clearly by extension, to Plaintiff as well. It should be noted that plaintiff’s evaluation of Judge Conner’s memorandum was independently confirmed, without input by Plaintiff by three separate attorneys.
8. From there out, what was at issue in Judge Conner’s memorandum was never addressed by the Court, but it all became about my then-attorney having to repeatedly defend himself, which by sheer necessity, took away from representing Plaintiff on the issues.
9. This hostility by the federal court extended into a bankruptcy proceeding before Judge Mary France, involving my father, Phillip L. Conklin, represented by then-Attorney, Andrew J. Ostrowski, as occurred on or about November 2008. During this proceeding, as thereafter reported to Plaintiff, even though Plaintiff was not a party to the proceedings, Plaintiff was repeatedly attacked by the court.
10. What is particularly interesting here is the fact that Plaintiff’s property was unlawfully sold by Defendant JPMorgan Chase, f/k/a Chase Bank of Texas on October 18, 2004, while Plaintiff was in bankruptcy. At the time of the sale, there was no judgment on Plaintiff’s property, and though the Sheriff, the Solicitor, and the bank’s attorney were informed that the sale was illegal, because there was no judgment, and because they were employing a docket number for a different property, the proceeded to sell Plaintiff’s property anyways.
11. Prior to the sale, Plaintiff filed an emergency motion with the Bankruptcy court, but could not obtain a hearing until three (3) days after the sale occurred.
12. Nonetheless, and as the transcripts of this hearing reveal, Judge France, upon hearing the details of what was going on, exclaimed, “this is bizarre” and further emphatically stated there was “collusion”. Accordingly, she informed Plaintiff he would get a hearing on these matters, and be prepared to do discovery, and then set a follow-up hearing for on or about November 18, 2004.
13. When Plaintiff returned the following month for the scheduled hearing, it was if night and day took place. It was clear Plaintiff was not going to get his hearing, and when pressed as to why, Judge France said to the effect, she made a mistake, and then promptly dismissed Plaintiff’s case.
14. Had that Court held the hearing the Judge said Plaintiff would get, we would not be here now; but, as is a re-occurring theme throughout, once more Plaintiff was denied a full, fair and impartial opportunity to present his claims. Plaintiff however, did regain property possession.
15. Other than in the context of the hostility that Judge Conner initiated, it otherwise remains a mystery as to why Judge France would verbally attack Plaintiff during a hearing where he was neither present or a party to.
16. On August 12, 2011, Plaintiff took the stand and testified at Don Bailey’s disciplinary hearings and had the clear impression as he sat on the stand that they were laying in wait for him, that they knew who Steve Conklin was and that they had something planned for him.
17. Plaintiff was obstructed by the Disciplinary chairman, Brian Cali, and Defense counsel from offering full and complete answers, and when he did so, he was threatened with arrest for disorderly conduct by a Commonwealth Court Tipstaff, who had no authority to speak; essentially and unequivocally, Plaintiff’s testimony was directly interfered with Plaintiff being further threatened by Tipstaff, Bob Snook.
18. Following Judge Kane’s striking pertinent portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint, and his motion for recusal in it’s entirety, sua sponte, Judge Kane proceeded to launch a personal and spurious attack on Plaintiff, stating, prior to her recusal, that Plaintiff “ has a longstanding and outrageous pattern of hostility towards the court and its judicial officers.”
19. Plaintiff, as well as his brother noted that every single time either entered into the federal courthouse, for purposes of filing and whatnot, Federal Marshalls would each and every time follow either Plaintiff or his brother into the elevator and up to the clerks office, and upon completion of Plaintiff’s business with the court, proceed to follow them back into the elevator and back to the lobby area.
20.  No more was this so serious as leading up to September 28^th when it became clear (by the Marshall’s conversation on his radio) that Plaintiff has been put on some kind of list, (presumably as some sort of threat) and Plaintiff was detained for nearly a minute or more in the elevator while one Marshall held the door and waited for another Marshall to come into the elevator to continue keeping Plaintiff under watch and custody.